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Abstract 
 Although supply chain disruptions are inevitable, frameworks have been 
developed for addressing supply chain risks.  These frameworks present methods on 
mitigating, reducing or managing the risks through different approaches such as 
multiple sourcing.  The research presented here identified two factors that contribute to 
successful recovery from supply chain disruptions.  One factor is efficient 
communication between stakeholders in a supply chain.  The communication needs to 
be present before a disruption occurs to enable fast detection.  After a disruption occurs 
efficient communications will help minimize confusion and provide clear understanding 
of the recovery effort between stakeholders.  The other factor is the inventory position 
downstream of the disruption.  In particular, the available days of supply downstream 
from the disruption relative to the length of the disruption are crucial to the ability of a 
supply chain to recover from the disruption without disturbing the continuity of supply. 
 In response to the effect of the days of supply compared to the recovery time a 
simple model is developed for assessing supply chain risk for an enterprise that sells 
products defined through a bill-of-materials.  The model takes into consideration the 
complexity of a product as more parts and more levels are added to the bill of material.  
The supply chain risk score metric permits comparison across products, companies and 
industries. The model is simple to apply by analyzing each part in bill-of-materials by a 
ranking system comparing the recovery time to the days of supply downstream from the 
disruption.  The supply chain risk score is to be used in parallel with other supply chain 
metrics in order to determine the best approach in reducing risks to an enterprise. 
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1 Introduction 
Recent events such as the 9/11 attack and the Katrina-Rita-Wilma hurricanes 
have heightened companies’ interest in business continuity planning, which includes 
addressing supply chain disruptions.  The identification of risks in a supply chain is 
neither trivial nor uniform across industries, companies or even product families.  
Researchers have developed frameworks to manage supply chain risks.  Supply chain 
risk factors can be internal to the supply chain such as production quality, transportation 
and cost. External factors to the supply chain include labor strikes, natural disasters, 
political and economic changes.  Supply chain risk assessment is an active area of 
research in academic literature.  The supply chain risk assessment systems are either 
product focused or supplier focused.  These risk assessment systems rely on the 
estimation of the probability of an event occurring in one of the external or internal risk 
factors and the subsequent monetary damage from the event to assess a risk.  The 
estimation of the probabilities for a supply chain system of a large company in the retail, 
grocery or defense is an extremely large problem.  Hence, this thesis explores a way to 
measure and quantify supply chain risk without considering the probabilities of 
disruptions. 
The estimation of risk within a supply chain is of interest not only to businesses 
for their Business Continuity Planning but also for insurers that underwrite polices.  
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Ericsson filed a claim of $200M that was covered by insurers.  Following the disaster 
Ericsson developed a supply chain risk management framework that was accepted by 
its insurers and helped reduce premiums (Norrman & Jansson, 2004).   
In order to gain an understanding of the problem of recovery from supply chain 
disruptions the efforts of a high tech company are documented.  The company, called 
here HighTech to protect its identity, is active in the Information Technology arena, 
producing hardware and software.  One internal disruption was caused by a quality 
issue affecting tens of thousands of items while the other, external, disruption was the 
loss of a supplier due to financial difficulties.  HighTech provided access to its supply 
chain and manufacturing organizations in order to learn about supply chain risk as it 
pertains to its operations.  The insights gained from this study motivated the 
development of a model for supply chain risk assessment.  A preliminary exploration of 
the model is presented together with some of its pros and cons. The thesis concludes 
with recommendations and conclusions drawn from the case studies and the proposed 
model. 
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2 Literature Review 
Since the events of September 11th, 2001 increased efforts have been placed on 
better understanding and measuring supply chain risk.  Research into supply chain risk 
assessment and management has flourished as supply chains have extended around 
the world.  The span of supply chains has increased their vulnerability to exposure from 
dangers both internal and external. Zsidisin et al. (2004) reviews current supply chain 
risk assessment techniques and concludes that purchasing organizations need to take a 
proactive approach to supply risk assessment in order to best understand the impact of 
disruptions on inbound supplies.  Furthermore, supply risk may be assessed as part of 
other management tools such as supplier qualification audits and performance 
improvement efforts with suppliers.  Pai, et. al, (2003) propose the use of a hybrid of 
Bayesian networks and fuzzy logic to evaluate risk in supply chains.  However the 
model is constrained by the amount of information necessary.  In particular, for a node, 
with four parents and four discrete states, 4094 probabilities need to be assigned.  
Hence the authors realize the difficulty in using such a model in a practical application. 
Researchers at the University of Cranfield propose a structured method for 
determining the supply chain risk (Cranfield University, 2003).  The process includes 
four steps starting with a description of the supply chains, then a vulnerability self 
assessment, followed by an evaluation of the implications and concluding with 
identifying actions.  The process helps companies develop actions that address both 
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mitigation and contingency in case of supply chain disruptions.  However the framework 
is based on company expertise and insight rather than an independent assessment 
system. 
One of the most well documented supply chain disruptions resulting in 
substantial loss of revenue and market share has been that of Ericsson, Sweden, due to 
a fire at a sub-contractor plant in Albuquerque, New Mexico (Wall Street Journal, 2001).  
Following that disaster Ericsson developed and implemented a proactive supply chain 
risk management approach (Norrman & Jansson, 2004). The process includes a risk 
identification process where components and services to Ericsson are mapped through 
the first and second tier suppliers and are classified by the number and type of sourcing 
such as single-sourced vs. multi-sourced part.  The next step identifies the “business 
recovery time” (BRT) depending on how quickly deliveries can return to pre-disruption 
levels by use of an alternative source.  The risk assessment process comes next for 
which Ericsson has developed an internal tool that takes into consideration the business 
processes, the financial health and the business continuity planning at the supplier. 
Additional information used in assessing risk is the natural and man-made 
hazards of the supplier site such as earthquakes and electricity shortages.  Ericsson 
does not use the customary “risk value” (impact x probability) due to the difficulties in 
attaining reasonable numbers for probability as well as impact.  Instead Ericsson uses 
internal resources to determine the Business Interruption Value (BIV) that is a product 
of the gross margin and the business recovery time.  This results in categorizing 
different disruptions in a 4x4 matrix of probability and consequence as seen below in 
Table 1. 
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 Table 1 Template for risk assessment 
 
Consequence 
Negligible Minor Major Severe 
P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
 Almost certain MEDIUM HIGH VERY HIGH VERY HIGH 
Likely MEDIUM HIGH HIGH VERY HIGH 
Unlikely LOW MEDIUM HIGH HIGH 
Rare LOW LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
(Norrman & Jansson, 2004) 
 
It is interesting to note that Ericsson treats as equivalents events with rare probability 
and severe consequence and an almost certain event with minor consequences, both 
are high.  The risk levels from very high to low require different actions as indicated in 
Table 2 .  The template for the risk assessment is arbitrary.  
Table 2 Template for risk treatment and contingency planning 
Degree of 
Risk 
Risk 
Level 
Action Required 
VERY 
HIGH 
Red 
Risk mitigation required to level medium or low. If the risk is not 
mitigated monitoring and making a contingency plan is required 
HIGH Orange 
Risk mitigation required to level medium or low. If the risk is not 
mitigated monitoring and making a contingency plan is required 
MEDIUM Yellow 
Risk mitigation required to level low is optional, monitoring is 
required 
LOW Green No further risk mitigation is required 
(Norrman & Jansson, 2004) 
 
The risk management is followed with risk monitoring and follow-up so that risks can be 
reduced down to the next level and preferable to a low status.  However, in cases where 
it is not possible to manage risk, contingency plans are created and documented.  The 
mitigation strategies and costs associated with them are compared to the business 
interruption value.   
 Kim et al. (2004) in a study that simulates supply chain robustness defines the 
supply chain cycle time resilience ratio, SCR, as: 
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Supply Chain cycle time under variation 
SCR=
Normal supply chain cycle time
 (1) 
This ratio indicates a resilient supply chain when the ratio is close to 1 and a non-
resilient supply chain when the ratio is much larger than 1, implying a supply chain cycle 
time under variation or disruption significantly larger than the normal cycle time.  No 
further information was located on the use of this resilience index.   
 Dong (2006) proposes the use of a robustness index based on the connectivity of 
each node as well as the accessibility of each node and link.  The robustness index (RI) 
is not bound on the top end of the spectrum and is only dependant on the size of the 
network being analyzed. Although the index can be used internally within a company to 
try and increase the robustness index it is not possible to compare robustness indices 
across companies. 
 In summary, frameworks have been developed for estimating and managing 
supply chain risk towards reducing the risk level of a particular supply chain.  These 
frameworks require estimation of all events that may cause a supply chain disruption 
thus making supply chain risk measurement cumbersome.  Lastly, these frameworks 
cannot be applied across companies for comparison purposes between these 
companies much like Earnings per Share (EPS) is used by financial investors. 
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3 Two supply chain disruptions  
HighTech is a publicly traded company active in the information technology 
sector.  It provides hardware and software solutions through direct sales, partners and 
value add resellers depending on the market segment.  The company has been in 
existence since the late 1970’s and has grown organically and through acquisitions over 
its lifetime becoming a leader in its sector.  In recent years its focus has been shifting 
towards software and services because hardware is increasingly commoditized while 
profit margins decrease.  HighTech provided access to its supply chain and 
manufacturing organizations for an analysis of supply chain risk drivers and disruption 
management.  A HighTech organizational chart with the main groups can be seen in 
Figure 1.   
 Figure 1 HighTech Hardware Operations Organization 
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HighTech's supply chain organization is focused on the inbound flow of material 
into manufacturing sites.  Three manufacturing sites are located in the US and Europe, 
serving customers in their respective geographical areas.  The US manufacturing sites 
serve the North and South American markets, while the European site serves the 
European, Middle East, Africa and Asia-Pacific markets (Figure 2).  The manufacturing 
sites are in essence final assembly test and configuration sites.  The main hardware 
components are sourced from contract manufacturers and suppliers across the globe, 
primarily from low cost geographies such as Mexico, Eastern Europe and Southeast 
Asia (Figure 3).   
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Distribution network 
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The supply base organization is tasked with managing the supplier relations in all 
of these geographies.  The supply base organization is based in the US with presence 
in all three manufacturing locations.  Furthermore, efforts are underway to place 
resources close to the current suppliers in low cost regions in Southeast Asia and 
Mexico.  The organization is responsible for qualifying a supplier through a review 
process that can last from one month to one year depending on the nature and criticality 
of the product the supplier will be providing.  The qualification process includes a 
technical and financial assessment.  The technical assessment covers all manufacturing 
areas of the supplier starting from incoming material, progressing through production 
and test and concluding with shipment and management of returned material.  The audit 
focuses on the processes, the quality audits and the management of defective material 
by the supplier.  Similarly the financial assessment focuses on the financial health and 
Figure 3 Supply network 
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the transaction handlings of the candidate supplier.  Suppliers who provide critical 
components that can directly impact customer experience are qualified under stringent 
requirements including margin testing at the high and low extremes of operating 
conditions, such as temperature, voltage, electromagnetic interference and vibration.  
This extensive testing is time and resource consuming and needs to be balanced with 
the needs for current product support as well as product development efforts.   
Following qualification of a supplier or new product the supply chain organization 
is responsible for monitoring and managing the quality of the incoming material and 
implementing corrective actions.  However, when defective material enters the three 
factories a purge process document is used to communicate required actions to the 
manufacturing organization.  The purge usually requires manufacturing to quarantine 
the defective or suspect material and either dispose of it as non salvageable or repair it, 
in-house or externally, before returning to the manufacturing process. 
3.1 Part quality issue 
Quality issues that result in purges are major disruptions in the operations of 
HighTech.  A purge is a process by which defective material or material suspect of 
defects is removed from the manufacturing process.  The material may be disposed of 
or repaired and returned to the manufacturing process depending on the issue.  Purges 
are seen as necessity in order to protect the user experience and the firm’s product, 
image and reputation.  Hence great efforts are taken to execute purges as rapidly and 
efficiently as possible.  The quality issues that result in purges are usually detected 
within the three manufacturing locations.  However it is often the case that not all sites 
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are impacted, depending on material flow.  Purges are also reviewed by a cross-
organizational board to decide on the necessity for a product recall impacting material 
that is downstream of the manufacturing sites either in the field spares or installed at 
customer locations.   
Product quality is ensured through design, manufacturing and test practices.  The 
defect detection strategy for each component and sub-assembly is a layered approach 
with ever increasing and complementary levels of detection as material flows through 
the assembly process, both externally at the suppliers and internally at the three sites of 
HighTech.  At the suppliers’ locations components are inspected to varying levels; 
however the defect detection at any one stage before the final test and configuration at 
the three manufacturing sites is not exhaustive.  HighTech selects to limit 
subcontractors’ ability to test due to intellectual property concerns.  As a result, quality 
issues may go undetected at the subcontractors.  Thus, most quality issues that result 
in a purge are detected during product testing within HighTech’s manufacturing.  
Another possibility is for a supplier to inform HighTech supplier engineers of the 
existence of a lot of suspect product that has already shipped from the supplier and is 
downstream from them in the supply chain. 
 
Figure 4 Material flow within HighTech's supply chain 
Supplier 1(Tier 2) 
Manufacture TEST 
Supplier (Tier 1) 
Manufacture TEST 
HighTech Manufacturing 
Configure TEST 
Customers 
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When HighTech’s technicians detect a failure they inform HighTech’s supplier 
engineer responsible for that particular commodity to jointly or solely determine the root-
cause of the failure.  The supplier engineer is responsible for the quality of incoming 
material from their supplier(s) and will take action with any failure found on the 
manufacturing floor.  If a trend is identified either by the supplier engineer, 
manufacturing quality control or the supplier then a discussion will start between the 
supplier engineer and quality control on the need for a purge. 
The purge is a major event for the corporation’s manufacturing sites and the 
supply chain organization as it disrupts the smooth flow of product and operations.  It is 
intended to stop the flow of defective or questionable material from leaving the factories 
and reaching the customers.  The purge is documented within the electronic product 
lifecycle management (PLM) system.  The document describes the nature of the quality 
issue and the extent of exposure.  The part numbers of effected assemblies are entered 
into the PLM system together with the serial number list or other genealogical 
information.  The purge is subsequently disseminated electronically for approval by the 
manufacturing, supply base and engineering organizations.  Upon approval of the 
purge, the PLM group uploads the effected serial number lists into the ERP system for 
tracking, disposition and clearance.   
At this point the purge is active and execution begins.  The execution steps have 
been predetermined during the approval process.  Steps may include inspection and 
repair or return to vendor or any number of other combinations.  The ERP system 
controls the flow of discrepant material throughout the factory based on “flags” that have 
been set.  Hence any material transaction will be checked against the active purge 
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serial number list.  Each assembly, as it moves within the factory, is tracked in the ERP 
system where quality information is entered after each test and nesting information is 
entered as subassemblies are added.  If any subassembly, within the transacted 
assembly, is flagged for a purge the transaction will stop until the effected subassembly 
is cleared.  This can mean the stoppage of material flow throughout the production 
process.   
 Once an item that is on the purge serial number list is detected, the purge 
process may require an inspection and return to manufacturing operations, repair or 
replacement depending on the nature of the quality defect.  The purge document will 
specify the nature of activities as well as the retest process if an assembly needs to be 
taken apart or an item repaired.  This discovery, repair and retest can be very time 
consuming as the test process can exceed three to four days for some products.  
 The current process requires that supplier engineers authoring purges impacting 
production material complete a World Wide Purge Costing model spreadsheet.  The 
intention of this model is to capture the costs associated with executing this purge.  The 
model captures labor, material, equipment and transportation costs associated with 
returning impacted material to production.  However the model does not capture costs 
such as impact to deliveries and development schedules or inventory costs associated 
with the material being purged. 
 The following is an example of a quality purge that impacted operations recently.  
The event started unraveling when a Tier 1 supplier sent product back to a Tier 2 
supplier for failure analysis as some of the product was failing during final test at the 
factory of the Tier 1 supplier.  The transfer of material was for seven to eight defective 
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units, a small fraction of the total material manufactured by the Tier 1 supplier.  The 
transfer occurred towards the end of the financial quarter as suppliers try to minimize 
inventories in their factories by shipping products to the customers and failed 
components to suppliers for failure analysis.  A timeline of the events can be seen in 
Figure 5. 
 
 
The Tier 2 supplier, upon receipt of the defective material, started to pursue root-
cause analysis.  At this time the Tier 2 supplier informed the HighTech supplier engineer 
of receiving this defective material as part of the weekly quality call where issues with 
production are discussed between the supplier and the HighTech engineer.  The 
supplier engineer then proceeded to drive the resolution of this issue.  Within a couple 
of days the Tier 2 supplier determined that the defect was not caused by their 
manufacturing process and informed the supplier engineer at HighTech of this result.  
The failure analysis lab at HighTech came to the same conclusion by analyzing product 
Figure 5 Timeline of quality issue 
Week 0: Defective product sent from Tier 1 to 
Tier 2 supplier. 
HightTech informed by Tier 2 supplier. 
Week 2: Purge issued. HASS 
testing started. 
Week -52: 
Defective test 
fixture installed. 
 
Week 1: Defective product sent to 
HighTech, analyzed at FA lab, Root-Cause 
determined, suspect population 
determined. X-functional team. informed 
Week 3: No risk from 
accelerated testing of defective 
product at customer locations 
Week 5: Release of 
quarantined material 
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at HighTech’s factory from the same vintage as the failures.  However the lab staff had 
a further insight to the cause of the defect.   
The lab staff, in cooperation with the supplier engineer, noticed that the defect 
had the signature marks of a test process.  The next step was to engage the test 
engineering team at HighTech that is responsible of developing all test applications and 
test processes for this type of product.  The test engineers quickly realized what was 
causing the defect was a design error in the test process.  The test engineers assisted 
the lab engineers in replicating the defect on known good product.  The supply base 
manager responsible for this product informed the cross functional team responsible for 
monitoring the production quality within HighTech. 
The cross functional team consists of managers from engineering, 
manufacturing, supply base management, procurement and logistics.  The team is 
tasked with addressing any issues that could impact production within HighTech’s 
plants and meets weekly.  The team was informed of the current state and 
understanding of the problem and the steps to follow.  Hence, within four days of the 
Tier 2 supplier first alerting HighTech of the returned product the root-cause of the 
defect had been identified and the stakeholders within HighTech were aware of the 
developing situation. 
The next step taken by HighTech was to understand the population of product 
suspect of being defective within manufacturing, engineering labs and customer 
locations.  The test engineers in collaboration with the Tier 1 supplier and the supplier 
engineer responsible for the Tier 1 supplier were able to understand the magnitude of 
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the problem.  The issue was caused by a wrongly built test fixture that was in use at the 
Tier 1 supplier from a very early stage in the lifecycle of the product. 
As the end of the second week approached, the Tier 1 supplier provided a serial 
number list for all suspect product and it soon became evident that all material currently 
at HighTech as well as material at customers of HighTech was suspect for this defect.  
The large population of suspect product and in particular the existence of suspect 
product in the field caused HighTech to pursue further testing while a Purge was issued 
to quarantine product in-house.  So by the third week, since first finding out about the 
shipment of defective material from the Tier 1 to the Tier 2 suppliers, the root-cause had 
been determined and a purge was issued. 
The purge document requested HighTech manufacturing to inspect a large 
population of product, in the tens of thousands, and segregate the worst case conditions 
based on guidelines provided by the failure analysis lab.  The failure analysis lab in 
coordination with manufacturing performed destructive analysis and characterization of 
worst case conditions of the defect as well as Highly Accelerated Stress Screening 
(HASS).  The results from these tests provided crucial information to HighTech for the 
behavior and reliability of product.  It became evident that product which had not failed 
during the test processes, at the Tier 1 supplier or HighTech, would not fail in the field, 
at a customer.  However, a repair procedure was instituted at HighTech for all in-house 
material in an effort to minimize risks.  As the inspection progressed it became evident 
that only 10% of the suspect product required repair.  This low impact coupled with the 
ability to repair did not require the ordering of material to cover shortages.  However, 
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procurement was preparing Tier 1 suppliers to expedite new product builds in order to 
minimize impact to the deliveries to HighTech customers. 
In discussions with the supplier engineers, test engineers and manufacturing 
engineers as well as procurement at HighTech there were some recurring themes that 
highlighted the ability of HighTech to respond to this disruption.  The main one is 
communication.  As soon as the supplier engineer was first informed by the Tier 2 
supplier of the issue, communication within HighTech as well as across the supply chain 
was managed effectively.  That meant stakeholders were provided with the necessary 
information to make decisions or be aware of decisions being made.  The existence of 
the cross-functional team enabled the dissemination of information and status update to 
many number of stakeholders but minimized confusion and different message paths.  
Two other related factors are the technology enablers of the in-house failure analysis 
lab and the quality control (QC) system within HighTech.  The in-house lab, having very 
good familiarity with the product and the manufacturing process, was able to rapidly 
determine the root-cause.  The quality control system within HighTech enabled supplier 
engineers to quickly get a picture of where material was located physically.  The QC 
system enabled engineers to trace all suspect material for any related events that could 
provide evidence for this defect.  One area where HighTech felt improvement was 
necessary was in the monitoring of suppliers for defects.  In particular the yields for this 
product were very high, above 98% and the defects in general are minor.  However 
HighTech management believes the severity of this particular defect when detected at 
the Tier 1 supplier should have caused a more focused response by the supplier and 
the alerting of HighTech to the issue. 
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The rapid and successful recovery from the quality issue can be attributed to a 
number of factors.  The rapid identification of the root-cause of the defect and extent of 
exposure enabled the manufacturing operations to repair material progressing though 
the test process.  The nonexistent risk from material at customers allowed HighTech to 
focus resources to in-house material only.  The presence of sufficient inventory within 
the test process at HighTech allowed the manufacturing process to continue while the 
defective inventory was being purged and repaired. 
3.2 Loss of supplier 
HighTech manufacturing is faced with a couple of purges each quarter due to 
supplier issues.  Hence the supply base and manufacturing organizations have learned 
how to best minimize disruptions.  On the other hand, the loss of a supplier due to 
financial reasons or other catastrophic event is a very infrequent event for which 
HighTech does not have a process guiding the recovery.  The loss of a supplier, unlike 
the quality issues, usually impacts many part numbers that the supplier provides.  
HighTech was recently faced with the loss of a Tier 2 supplier (called here SheetMetal 
Inc.) with operations in Eastern Europe.  SheetMetal Inc. fed a Tier 1 supplier who in-
turn supported the European manufacturing site of HighTech.  SheetMetal Inc. is active 
in an industry characterized by low margins and high capital investments.  Although 
SheetMetal has been a supplier to HighTech for the last four – five years it went into 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2002 and reemerged in two months later after restructuring.  
As the supply base strategic manager said “sheet metal stamping (manufacturers) are 
on the edge (of bankruptcy) because it’s tough to make money”.  The manager 
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mentioned that every couple of months there is a new rumor in the industry that one of 
the stamping suppliers is facing hardship and could be going under.  The manager 
usually investigates these rumors by calling the supplier, asking for information and 
financial statements to assess the health of the supplier.  Other means used to assess 
the financial health are reports from Dun & Bradstreet, industry news feeds and other 
suppliers. 
In early 2007, Tier 3 suppliers, providing material to SheetMetal, called the 
supplier manager at HighTech asking for assistance in receiving payment for goods 
provided.  SheetMetal was more than 30 days late on payments for goods received.  
The supplier manager, realizing that SheetMetal may be in financial trouble, called his 
contacts at the company.  The executive vice president of the Eastern European factory 
of SheetMetal responded that there are indeed challenges and SheetMetal was looking 
for a buyer for the factory and all would be resolved within a week.  A timeline of the 
events as they unfolded is seen in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 Timeline of supplier loss 
Week 1: Tier 3 suppliers not receiving payments, 
call HighTech. Tier 2 looking to sell factory. 
Week 3: HighTech audits suppliers 
and selects replacement. 
Week 2: Tier 2 effort to sell factory falls 
through. HighTech pulls tools. Demand is 
fulfilled from Tier 2 in other Geo (US, Eur) 
Week 4: Tooling 
transfer and repair 
Week 5: Qualification 
production starts up. 
Week 7: New Tier 2 
supplier qualified 
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When the HighTech supplier manager tried to call again a week later he could 
not reach any of the contacts.  The EVP at SheetMetal called back the following day 
stating that the effort to sell the factory was not successful and SheetMetal was 
exploring other options.  The HighTech supplier manager decided that the best course 
of action was to rapidly disengage with this supplier and try to recover the tooling from 
the factory as the financial troubles could rapidly escalate to insolvency for SheetMetal 
Inc. 
As this decision was made a team of supplier managers, supplier engineers and 
Tier 1 representatives established a conference call to coordinate actions.  The brunt of 
the work was executed by the HighTech personnel in the US and European 
manufacturing locations.  The Tier 1 supplier provided recommendations for a new 
sheet metal supplier and HighTech sent supplier engagement teams to audit them as 
well as other options.  The audits were executed based on standardized processes that 
include technical and financial operations assessment.  One major concern before 
HighTech disengaged with SheetMetal was the removal of tooling from the SheetMetal 
factory as these are high value and long lead time assets.  Hence, HighTech employees 
tagged all stamping dies at the SheetMetal factory and removed the tooling within three 
days of the decision to disengage.  Last but not least, in order not to disrupt the 
continuity of supply other Tier 2 suppliers were asked to increase production to cover for 
the loss of SheetMetal.  There was a price premium for this action as procurement costs 
were higher due to transportation but the continuity of supply was secured. 
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Three weeks after first indications of trouble at SheetMetal, HighTech had 
recovered the tooling and selected an alternate supplier to recover production.  A short 
term solution was in place to satisfy demand with production from other Tier 2 suppliers.  
The long term solution, to bring up a new supplier location, was in process as the 
tooling was transferred to the new supplier by the fourth week.  Qualification production 
started by the sixth week and two weeks later full production had resumed at the new 
Tier 2 supplier location. 
The supplier manager at HighTech was quick to point out that the loss of 
SheetMetal, although sudden and disruptive happened at a very fortunate period.  The 
parts supplied by SheetMetal were sourced at two other suppliers, one in Europe and 
one in the US thus ensuring redundant sources.  Although there was a premium for 
transportation and cost, the demand could be satisfied by these two suppliers. The new 
supplier location selected was a Czech factory of an existing Tier 2 European supplier.  
This fact minimized the learning curve as the supplier was familiar with the product, 
processes and expectations of HighTech.  Furthermore, the “new” supplier was willing 
to rapidly deploy resources from the current production location to the Czech factory to 
expedite ramp-up to production.  Once again fast communications between the US and 
European operations of HighTech and the Tier 1 supplier contributed to the recovery.  
The team had a daily conference call to address any issues and two to three email 
updates through the day.  The time difference between the US and Europe was used to 
rapidly complete tasks within an “extended work day” as tasks were handed off between 
each HighTech location during the conference call.  Similarly to the quality issue, one 
additional enabler was the deep technical know-how at HighTech of the sheet metal 
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product, processing requirements and supplier capabilities.  This know-how, in 
conjunction with a good understanding of the delivery requirements permitted the rapid 
and successful selection of a new manufacturing site and the proper scheduling of 
ramping of production. 
Most importantly the Tier 1 supplier had all inventory of parts required to satisfy 
the demand for the quarter!  The existence of this inventory within the supply chain 
allowed the continuity of supply.  Similarly, for the quality purge described earlier, 
deliveries to customers were not disrupted as the inventory on hand permitted the 
smooth execution of the purge without disruption to the delivery schedule.   
3.3 Observations 
The two cases described provide some key factors that enabled HighTech to 
recover from the supply chain disruptions it faced.  One factor is the importance of 
communication between the supply chain partners.  In both cases HighTech received 
first indications of the disruption from suppliers upstream of where the disruption was 
occurring.  HighTech is structured in such a way that it has close relations with suppliers 
upstream to the Tier 3 level and beyond for some parts.  These relations serve well only 
when information flows freely between the supply chain members.   
The second factor that contributed to the recovery was the communication 
between stakeholders once the disruption had occurred and was detected.  HighTech 
has one main forum, a cross functional weekly meeting, for communicating issues that 
can impact production.  The forum is attended by management from engineering, 
supply chain management and manufacturing.  Similar meetings are held for each 
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manufacturing location due to minor differences in product mix.  However, when an 
issue impacting multiple locations arises, then the meeting across manufacturing 
locations is consolidated so as to facilitate communication across all stakeholders.  In 
the second case where the supplier in Europe was going out of business the 
coordination between the European and US supply chain organizations of HighTech 
was high thus enabling the quick recovery after the loss of the supplier. 
The last factor that contributed to the rapid recovery and the lack of impact to 
customer deliveries was the presence of sufficient inventory at locations downstream 
from the disruption as to avoid loss of continuity in the supply.  Thus, the days of supply 
downstream from a supply disruption is a critical factor when compared to the days to 
recovery from the disruption.  This observation led to the development of the supply 
chain risk model discussed in chapter 4. 
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4 Supply Chain Risk model 
4.1 Supply Chain Risk Model development 
 A review of current literature indicates that there is no universal metric for supply 
chain risk.  Norrman and Jansson (2004) present the supply chain risk management 
framework used at the telecommunications manufacturer Ericsson.  Supply chain risk 
managers were deployed within core units to manage and coordinate the optimal 
balance between risk exposure and risk mitigation.  However the process is complex 
and does not transport to other companies or industries. 
 Hence the desire to develop a supply chain risk measurement system that can 
be applied uniformly across industries is strong.  The model proposed herein is based 
on discussions with the personnel from HighTech and builds on concepts developed by 
Norrman and Jansson (2004).  The current development of the model is based on a 
manufacturing based company that produces items internally or externally at sub-
contractors. 
The model assumes the company has a number of products that consist of Bill of 
Materials following general tree structure as show in Figure 7. 
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The model starts by the analysis of every part number in a bill of materials (BOM). Each 
part number is assigned a score from 1 to 4 based on the following criteria (Table 3): 
Table 3 Supply Chain Risk Scale 
Scale Risk 
Disruption 
event 
Business Recovery Time (BRT) 
Recovery plan 
available 
4 None Unnoticeable Much less than days of supply Yes 
3 Low Noticeable Less than days of supply Yes 
2 Medium Noticeable More than days of supply Yes 
1 High Noticeable More than days of supply No 
 
The disruption event is any event that will stop the flow of the particular part number 
from the current source for an indefinite period of time.  The Business Recovery Time 
(BRT) is defined as the days to return the supply of that part number to the pre-
disruption level.  The BRT is compared to the inventory days of supply1 at the next level 
downstream in the supply chain or BOM.  The underlying logic being that if the flow of 
                                            
1
 Inventory Days of Supply = Inventory on hand / Average daily consumption rate 
Product 
Alpha 
Part No A 
Part No B 
Part No C 
Part No A1 
Part No A2 
Figure 7 Product Bill of Materials 
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parts is recovered before the on hand inventory is exhausted than the disruption in flow 
will not propagate further into the supply chain. 
 The next criterion is the existence of a recovery plan for the part number under 
analysis.  The recovery plan needs to be well understood by the supply chain partners 
and easily referred to in case of a disruption.   
Once each part number is ranked according to the above scale the aggregation 
by BOM level is performed.  The aggregate, R, Supply Chain Risk Score (
R
LSCRS ) for a 
particular BOM level, L, is the harmonic mean of the level’s part numbers:   
 
R
L
1
SCRS
1n
i i
n
x
 (2) 
Where: 
 SCRS: Supply Chain Risk Score 
L: is the BOM level 
 R: aggregate 
xi: is the rank of part number i. 
n: are all the part numbers or stock keeping unit (SKU). 
So that 
R
4SCRS is the aggregate score for the 4
th BOM level of a product 
The next step is to aggregate the risk levels across the different BOM levels 
using the harmonic mean.  This creates an aggregate risk level for a particular product, 
P, 
R
PSCRS .   
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R
P
R
1 L
SCRS
1
SCRSL
 (3) 
 
Where: 
 
R
PSCRS :is the aggregate Supply Chain Risk Score for a product, P. 
R
LSCRS : is the aggregate Supply Chain Risk Score for each BOM level, L. 
: is the total number of BOM levels. 
L: is the BOM level. 
The use of a harmonic mean is preferred compared to the arithmetic mean 
because it weighs a low ranking part more heavily as seen in Table 4. Although all three 
cases have an arithmetic mean of 3.00, in the 3rd case the harmonic mean of 2.00 more 
accurately represents the criticality of having a high risk part with a score of 1 in the bill 
of materials. 
 
Table 4 Comparison of means 
 Part Score Total Arithmetic mean Harmonic mean 
1st case 3 3 3 9 3.00 3.00 
2nd case 4 3 2 9 3.00 2.77 
3rd case 4 4 1 9 3.00 2.00 
 
The existence of a high risk part number in a BOM is more critical and 
detrimental to the supply chain than having multiple low risk parts with risk scores of 3.  
Hence, the use of a harmonic mean is one way to overweight low scores and is easy to 
calculate in order to indicate this differentiation in the aggregation of the part number 
score up to the BOM level score and then to the product supply chain risk scores. 
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There are two extensions that are applied to the risk levels at the BOM level in an 
effort to address the complexity of a BOM. In particular the following assumptions are 
made: 
1. Parts located at higher levels of a BOM, further away from the final product, are 
more risky. 
2. More parts at a particular level of a BOM are more risky then less parts in same 
level. 
The first assumption is based on the hypothesis that for a BOM with more levels, the 
product’s supply chain becomes increasingly more complicated to manage due to 
decreasing visibility by the final customer.  The second assumption is based on the 
hypothesis that management oversight and opportunities for disruption increase as 
more part numbers are added at a particular BOM level. 
  Hence a second set of supply chain risk metrics is created that scale the raw 
supply chain risk score by the effects of the BOM structure in both depth and breadth 
(number of parts at a level and number of BOM levels respectively).  This scaling is 
accomplished by using two decaying factors, one for BOM depth and another for 
breadth. The complexity decay factor, r, can range from 0 to 1. The BOM decay factor, 
b, can range from 0 to 1.  The relationship for scaling each level metric is: 
 
S R
L L
1 1
SCRS SCRS
b rL n
 (4) 
Where: 
S
LSCRS : is the scaled Supply Chain Risk Score for a particular BOM Level L. 
L: is the BOM level. 
b: is the BOM decay factor. 
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n: is the number of part numbers at the particular BOM level L. 
r: is the complexity decay factor. 
R
LSCRS : is the raw Supply Chain Risk Score for a particular BOM Level L 
 
The BOM scaling factor as a function of the number of BOM levels and the decay 
factor b is showed in the graphs below (Figure 8 and Figure 9 ).  The red line indicates 
the value of b (0.050) used in the models. 
Figure 8 Scaled score vs. BOM decay factor (0<b<1) for BOM levels 1 to 8 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
S
c
a
le
d
 s
c
o
re
BOM decay factor b
L1
L2
L3
L4
L5
L6
L7
L8
 
Page 42 of 61 
Figure 9 Scaled score vs. BOM decay factor (0<b<0.2)) for BOM levels 1 to 8 
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As seen in Figure 9 the BOM decay factor of 0.050 indicates that a part at the 3rd 
level will have its score reduced by 5%.  A part at the 8th level of a BOM will have its 
score reduced by 10% implying that the part at the 8th level of a BOM will be 10% more 
difficult to manage than a part in the 1st level of BOM.  The use of the BOM decay 
factor of 0.050 is only a proxy at this time.  A more thorough estimation of the decay 
factor and the decay function is needed based on industry analysis. 
Similarly the scaling of the supply chain risk score as a function of the complexity 
factor r and part numbers is shown in Figure 10 and Figure 11. Once again the 
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complexity factor r used in the models is 0.010 and is arbitrarily selected at this time.  
The complexity factor decreases the score of a BOM level with 100 parts by 5%.  The 
score of a BOM level having 1000 parts is reduced by 7%.  This reduction implies that 
its only 2% more difficult to manage 1000 parts compared to 100 parts.  This seems as 
a very small difference for an order of magnitude increase in part numbers.  As with the 
BOM decay factor further research is needed to better determine the range of the 
complexity factor. 
Figure 10 Scaled score vs. complexity factor (0<r<1) for different number of parts 
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Figure 11 Scaled score vs. complexity factor (0<r<0.05) for different number of parts 
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 The scaled (S) supply chain risk score, 
S
LSCRS of each level, L, is aggregated to 
the product level using the harmonic mean as was previously done for the raw product 
Supply Chain Risk Score: 
 
S
P
S
1 L
SCRS
1
SCRSL
 (5) 
Where  
S
PSCRS : is the scaled Supply Chain Risk Score for product P 
R
LSCRS : is the scaled Supply Chain Risk Score for each BOM level, L. 
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: is the total number of BOM levels. 
L: is the BOM level. 
It should be noted that for r=b=0 then 
S
LSCRS =
R
LSCRS  and 
S
PSCRS =
R
PSCRS  
The raw and scaled supply chain risk scores for each product are then rolled up to total 
supply chain metrics for the enterprise, E, 
S
ESCRS  and 
R
ESCRS .  The roll up is based 
on scaling each of the two product supply chain risk metrics by the contribution fraction, 
P, of each product to the profits of the company.   
 
S S
E P
P 1
SCRS SCRSP  (6) 
 
R R
E P
P 1
SCRS SCRSP  (7) 
Where  
S
ESCRS : Supply Chain Risk Score, subscript E for Enterprise, superscript S for 
scaled 
R
ESCRS : Supply Chain Risk Score, subscript E for Enterprise, superscript R for 
raw 
P : product contribution fraction to enterprise profits, where 
1P
1P  
P: products from 1 to  
The example on the following page demonstrates the proposed risk assessment 
system in a spreadsheet format (Figure 12).  The user is further assisted in the 
management of the supply chain risk by indicators of how many part numbers are 
ranked at each level (4 to 1) within each BOM level as well as for the product level.  An 
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additional indicator is the percentage of part numbers with a particular score (1-4) as a 
fraction of the total population of part numbers for each product.  Lastly the monetary 
contribution of each product to the profits of the enterprise is indicated. 
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Figure 12 Supply Chain Risk Scorecard 
Profit ($) Complexity decay factor, r 0.010
60,000,000$        
Profit contrib. BOM level 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4.000 3.848 100% BOM level decay factor, b 0.050 100% 97% 95% 93% 92% 91% 91% 90%
100% 96%
3.600 3.461 90% SCRSRP 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000
54,000,000$        SCRSSP 3.846 4.000 3.802 3.745
Number of 4's 9 100% 1 5 3 0 0 0 0 0
Number of 3's 0 0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Number of 2's 0 0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Number of 1's 0 0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total number of parts 9 1 5 3 0 0 0 0 0
4 4 4
4 4
4 4
4
4
0.400 0.387 10% SCRSRP 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000
6,000,000$         SCRSSP 3.867 4.000 3.822 3.786
Number of 4's 5 100% 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 0
Number of 3's 0 0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Number of 2's 0 0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Number of 1's 0 0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total number of parts 5 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 0
4 4 4
4
4
Enterprise
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
 
1
P
r
o
d
u
c
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2
SC Risk Score 
(raw)
SC Risk Score 
(scaled)
Profit contrib. 
(% and $) 
Part no 
score xi 
R
LSCRS  
S
LSCRS  
Product level 
indicators  
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4.2 Supply Chain Risk Model discussion 
The model presented thus far is able to determine the supply chain risk score of 
an enterprise.  The discussion that follows presents four scenarios to demonstrate 
aspects of the model and can provide insights on the risk metric of a supply chain.  The 
models will demonstrate the following scenarios:   
Scenario 1: A product with the same number of parts but distributed differently 
within the BOM.   
Scenario 2: The effect of a medium risk part at different BOM levels  
Scenario 3: The effect of one medium risk part vs. two low risk parts. 
Scenario 4: The effect of one medium risk part or two low risk parts at different 
BOM levels. 
These scenarios are only a sample of the possible circumstances that can be 
encountered in a supply chain.  They are based on some of the circumstances that can 
face users in the application of the model.  The discussion provides some guidance on 
possible approaches to addressing supply chain risk. 
 
4.2.1 Scenario 1: A product with the same number of parts but 
distributed differently within the BOM.   
In the first scenario two products made of eight part numbers are compared.  
Product 1 has one part at the BOM level 1, five parts at BOM level 2 and two parts at 
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BOM level 2.  The second product has one part at the BOM level 1, three parts at BOM 
level 2, three parts at BOM level 2 and 3.  All parts are rated with a 4 for no risk.  The 
Supply Chain Risk Score, SCRS, for each product is the same (4) when the effect of 
product complexity is ignored (thin arrows).  However, the scaled SCRS for each 
product is lower, product 1 has a score of 3.851 and product 2 a score of 3.819. This 
difference in SCRS is due to the product complexity (number of BOM levels and number 
of parts).  This difference in SCRS of products made of parts with very low risk could 
drive supply chain managers to try and decrease the complexity of products by either 
reducing the number of BOM levels in a product or the number of parts.  For a product 
with fixed functionality the reduction in the number of BOM levels could result in more 
assembly steps being done all at once.   
One needs to keep in mind that the underlying assumption of the model is that as 
production transitions between BOM levels, hand-offs take place between different 
members of a supply chain. For example, a computer has a BOM that at level 1 would 
be the Central Processing unit (CPU), usually assembled at an integrator or Electronic 
Manufacturing Services company.  At the second BOM level, the CPU is composed of a 
chassis, a power supply, a motherboard, a graphics card, a hard drive and an optical 
drive.  These five parts can be sourced from different suppliers and being assembled by 
the integrator.  Similarly, the motherboard, at BOM level 3, is consists of a printed circuit 
board and components sourced from hundreds of suppliers. At each BOM level there is 
a change of ownership and transfer of parts that requires increase visibility as well as 
management of the risk to a disruption. 
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4.2.2   Scenario 2: Effect of a medium risk part at different BOM 
levels  
The second scenario is a comparison of two products with identical BOM 
structure.  Product 1 has one medium risk (2) part at BOM level 3.  Product 2 has one 
medium risk (2) part at BOM level 2.  All other parts are no risk (4).  The raw SCRS for 
both products is 3.429.  On the other hand, the scaled SCRS for product 1 is 3.298 
while for product 2 its 3.308.  This difference is due to the effect of the BOM complexity 
factor, r, which discounts the risk score of a part located at higher levels of a BOM.  
Hence it is preferred to have a risky part further up in the supply chain, closer to the 
Scenario 1  
SCRSRP 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000
SCRSSP 3.851 4.000 3.802 3.760
Number of 4's 8 100% 1 5 2 0 0
Number of 3's 0 0% 0 0 0 0 0
Number of 2's 0 0% 0 0 0 0 0
Number of 1's 0 0% 0 0 0 0 0
Total number of parts 8 1 5 2 0 0
4 4 4
4 4
4
4
4
SCRSRP 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000
SCRSSP 3.819 4.000 3.822 3.760 3.706
Number of 4's 8 100% 1 3 2 2 0
Number of 3's 0 0% 0 0 0 0 0
Number of 2's 0 0% 0 0 0 0 0
Number of 1's 0 0% 0 0 0 0 0
Total number of parts 8 1 3 2 2 0
4 4 4 4
4 4 4
4
Product 1 
Product 1 
Product 1 
Product 2 
Product 1 
Product 2 
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product (level 2 part).  The underlying assumption is once again that higher visibility 
exists in the sourcing organization for parts in proximity to the final product than for 
distant parts in the supply chain.  This should lead to a behavior where riskier parts 
sourced from higher Tier suppliers are addressed first.  However this behavior is only 
observed for the scaled supply chain risk scores.  As noted the raw SCRS does not 
show a preference as to where a riskier part is located in the BOM.  If the decay 
functions and constants are not the same across industries and companies than only 
raw scores can be compared between companies and products. 
 
 
Scenario 2 
SCRSRP 3.429 4.000 4.000 2.667
SCRSSP 3.298 4.000 3.837 2.507
Number of 4's 4 80% 1 2 1 0
Number of 3's 0 0% 0 0 0 0
Number of 2's 1 20% 0 0 1 0
Number of 1's 0 0% 0 0 0 0
Total number of parts 5 1 2 2 0
4 4 2
4 4
SCRSRP 3.429 4.000 2.667 4.000
SCRSSP 3.308 4.000 2.558 3.760
Number of 4's 4 80% 1 1 2 0
Number of 3's 0 0% 0 0 0 0
Number of 2's 1 20% 0 1 0 0
Number of 1's 0 0% 0 0 0 0
Total number of parts 5 1 2 2 0
4 2 4
4 4
A high risk part at 
level 2 preferred to 
one at level 3 
Product 1 
Product 2 
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4.2.3 Scenario 3: The effect of one medium risk part vs. two low risk 
parts. 
The third scenario demonstrates the effect of having a medium risk part in the 
BOM.  Product 1 has two low risk parts with a rating of 3 at BOM level 2.  Product 2, on 
the other hand, has one medium risk part with a rating of 2 and a no risk part with a 
rating of 4 at BOM level 2.  The raw SCRS is 3.000 in the product 1 compared to 2.667 
for product 2. Similarly the scaled SCRS is 3.474 and 3.308.  This scenario indicates 
that management should try to first improve part numbers that have a medium or high 
risk score before addressing parts with low risk.  This recommendation is independent 
of the use of the scaled or raw SCR scores.  The additional indicators, such as the 
number of parts with each rankling, can help identify higher risk parts within a product 
quickly in order to be addressed to reduce supply chain risk. 
  
SCRSRP 3.600 4.000 3.000 4.000
SCRSSP 3.474 4.000 2.878 3.760
Number of 4's 3 60% 1 0 2 0
Number of 3's 2 40% 0 2 0 0
Number of 2's 0 0% 0 0 0 0
Number of 1's 0 0% 0 0 0 0
Total number of parts 5 1 2 2 0
4 3 4
3 4
SCRSRP 3.429 4.000 2.667 4.000
SCRSSP 3.308 4.000 2.558 3.760
Number of 4's 4 80% 1 1 2 0
Number of 3's 0 0% 0 0 0 0
Number of 2's 1 20% 0 1 0 0
Number of 1's 0 0% 0 0 0 0
Total number of parts 5 1 2 2 0
4 2 4
4 4
One high risk (2) 
part is worse 
than two low risk 
parts (3) 
Scenario 3 
Product 1 
Product 2 
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4.2.4 Scenario 4: The effect of one medium risk part or two low risk 
parts at different BOM levels 
The fourth scenario is a variation of the third where product 1 has a medium high 
risk (2) part at level 2 and product 2 has two low risk (3) parts at BOM level 3.  The 
scenario is looking at the preferred location of a high risk part within a BOM.  As seen 
the raw product SCRS is the same for both products at 3.600.  This would imply that the 
risk for these two products is equivalent.  This is a shortcoming of the current model it 
cannot differentiate between the two cases.  The scaled SCRS for product 1 is 3.469 
and for product 2 it is 3.463.  The model places a higher premium to parts with risk at 
higher BOM levels.  Furthermore, the additional indicators on the percentage of part 
numbers in each risk category should lead management to address the parts with lower 
risk scores as product 1 has 17% of parts with a score of 2 while product 2 has 0% 
parts with a score of 1 or 2.  As earlier stated, attention should be focused first on 
addressing parts with the lowest risk scores, 1 then 2 before moving up to the less risky 
parts with a score of 3.   
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4.3 Guidelines for users 
The prioritization should be linked in the mind of the user to the score ranking 
and the scale used.  A part with a score of 1 is most critical as the Business Recovery 
Time (BRT) is unknown and no plan exists addressing the recovery process.  Similarly, 
a part with a score of 2 does have a recovery plan but a BRT exceeding the inventory 
days of supply at the next level.  The result from a disruption of a part with a score of 2 
will, most likely, be that supplies will be exhausted and the flow of goods will be 
disrupted. 
SCRSRP 3.600 4.000 3.000 4.000
SCRSSP 3.469 4.000 2.866 3.760
Number of 4's 5 83% 1 2 2 0
Number of 3's 0 0% 0 0 0 0
Number of 2's 1 17% 0 1 0 0
Number of 1's 0 0% 0 0 0 0
Total number of parts 6 1 3 2 0
4 2 4
4 4
4
SCRSRP 3.600 4.000 4.000 3.000
SCRSSP 3.463 4.000 3.822 2.820
Number of 4's 4 67% 1 3 0 0
Number of 3's 2 33% 0 0 2 0
Number of 2's 0 0% 0 0 0 0
Number of 1's 0 0% 0 0 0 0
Total number of parts 6 1 3 2 0
4 4 3
4 3
4
Scenario 3 
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The model provides the user with the monetary profit contribution to the 
enterprise for each product.  The intention for this metric is to be used as a comparison 
to improvement plans.  The cost of any plan to raise a part number’s score needs to be 
compared to the profit contribution.  An improvement plan for a part number that 
exceeds the profit contribution of a particular product should be scrutinized.  For 
example if the improvement to raise a part from a score of 1 to 2 costs $1M but the 
profit contribution of the product is only $200K the improvement may not be justifiable. 
Other aspects that need to be considered besides the profit contribution are the 
strategic intentions of the company and the lifecycle of the product.  In the above case if 
the product is during its launch phase and profits are expected to improve in 
subsequent years the improvement effort may be worthwhile.  Similarly, if the product is 
targeted into a particular market segment that the company is trying to enter than the 
investment may be worthwhile.  Conversely, if the company is exiting the particular 
market segment or the product is close to the end-of-life than any further investment 
may not be justified. 
In my discussions with supply base professionals from HighTech the model was 
seen as innovative. The approach does not bring in the complexities of probabilities for 
different events, which are difficult for a company to assess.  The implementation of the 
system in a corporate setting was raised as a concern.  The model requires that all part 
numbers be ranked based on the scale of low risk (4) to high risk (1) (Table 3).  This 
can be a long process when more than a few hundred part numbers are used 
throughout the products of a company.  In the case of HighTech this effort would be 
similar in scale to the effort for updating all part numbers with Restriction of Hazardous 
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Substances Directive (ROHS) status information.  However, guidelines could further 
assist in automating the risk assessment process.  As an example, parts that are 
sourced from more than three suppliers and are commoditized could be ranked with a 
low risk of 4.  Parts that are single sourced would need to be analyzed with a higher 
scrutiny before determining their supply chain risk score.  
 Up to this point the model for assessing the supply chain risk has been 
presented.  The next step would be to look at how to improve the score rating.  The 
score of each part number, and by extension the product score and the enterprise 
score, can be improved by two approaches.  One approach to improve the score of a 
part is to put in place inventory to exceed the business recovery time from a disruption.  
This approach will result in increased inventory within the supply chain.  The large 
inventories can have detrimental effects in the supply chain as more inventories can 
lead to larger inventory carrying costs and larger charges for excess and obsolescence 
of material.   
The second approach to improve the score of a particular part number is to 
develop an efficient recovery plan that reduces the business recovery time (BRT) well 
below the days of supply of the part at the next level within the supply chain.  One 
approach is to have multiple active sources of the part or qualified suppliers that can 
quickly provide supply.  One concern to have in such cases is that a disruption that 
impacts a particular part with multiple consumers will force the customer to turn to the 
same alternate suppliers.  In such a case, the allocation of the production at the 
alternate supplier can become a contest between customers. 
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The supply chain risk metric model provides one metric for evaluating a supply 
chain for risk.  However, a supply chain needs to be evaluated using a variety of supply 
chain metrics to look at different factors.  Such metrics include but are not limited to 
those recommended by the SCOR model, for example:  Perfect Order Fulfillment, Order 
Fulfillment Cycle Time, Cash-to-Cash Cycle Time (Supply Chain Council, 2005). 
The supply chain risk metric developed through this model provides an insight 
into the ability of a supply chain to recover from a catastrophic disruption impacting a 
part in a Bill-of-Material (BOM).  It accounts for the difficulties of managing products with 
increasing complexity due to the number of parts and depth of the BOM.  The model 
creates a metric that could be used to compare supply chain risk across companies and 
industries for BOM based product.  The model could be extended to other industries, 
where a BOM is not present but other hand-offs in information, currency and product 
take place. 
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5 Conclusions 
This research identified two of the factors that have enabled the rapid recovery 
from a supply chain disruption using cases from a single company in the information 
technology sector.  In the two cases documented two main factors were identified. One 
factor was effective and rapid communication between stakeholders across the supply 
chain.  The use of cross-functional teams and meetings kept stakeholders involved and 
informed of the recovery process.  The close relation and monitoring of upper tier 
suppliers (2nd, 3rd etc) enable better visibility in the supply chain before a disruption 
occurs.  The close communication and monitoring of all members of a supply chain 
permits early detection and reaction to a disruption.  The early detection can minimize 
the impact of the disruption and provide valuable time to start recovery efforts. 
The second factor that enabled a successful recovery was presence of sufficient 
inventory downstream of the disruption not to stop the continuity of supply.  Although 
the overabundance of inventory is viewed as negative, inventory extends the timeframe 
during which recovery from a supply chain disruption can take place. 
The observed relation between inventory and ability to recover, from a supply 
chain disruption, led to the formulation of the supply chain risk score model.  The model 
is based on principals used at Ericsson (Norrman & Jansson, 2004).  However this 
model is simplified by disregarding the probabilities of different disruption events taking 
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place.  The model is focused on the aftermath from a disruption event and in particular 
the recovery and return to normalcy.  The model assissts users in focusing attention to 
the high risk parts.  In general, parts with high and medium risk should be addressed 
first.  The risk can be reduced by effecting either reducing the business recovery time 
(BRT) or increasing the inventory of finished parts.  The BRT can be reduced by 
qualifying alternate suppliers or increasing available capacity with multiple current 
suppliers.  In all cases a recovery plan for each part should be developed before a 
disruption occurs.  The cost of the risk reduction effort through BRT or inventory should 
be compared to the profit contribution of the product.  If the cost exceeds the profit 
contribution than the reduction in risk may not be justifiable. 
The model was developed based on a company with a product structure based 
on the use of bill of materials (BOM).  The next step would likely be to apply the model 
to an actual case and better understand its stregths and weaknesses.  HighTech has 
expressed interest in using this model to assess its supply chain risk at this time.  The 
use of the model is easy to teach to potential users thus making it attractive for 
implementation. 
The model should be extended for use in other industries such as 
pharmaceuticals, fresh produce and service industries.  As an example, for bananas, 
the different BOM levels may be interpreted as the different changes in ownership/hand 
off of product from the producer, to the wholeseller, to the brand and finaly to the 
supermarket and the customer.  Similarly, service industries such as cruise operators 
may consider their supply chain risk in the operation of a cruise, from the flow of 
supplies and the flow of vacationers to its cruise vessels.  Once again the BOM levels 
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may be considered as the steps within the supply chain where the product changes 
ownership.  
In conclusion, this study identified two factors contributing to succesful recovery 
from supply chain disruptions: open and effiecient communications across the supply 
chain and inventory position downstream from the disruption.  The later factor spurred 
the development of a model for assesing supply chain risk of products using a bill-of-
material.  The model considers the complexity of the product and the ability for each 
part number to be sourced following a disruption within a timeframe relative to the days 
of supply downstream from the disruption. 
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